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Abstract—Most of the current cloud computing platforms offer
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model, which aims to provision
basic virtualised computing resources as on-demand and dynamic
services. Nevertheless, a single cloud does not have limitless
resources to offer to its users, hence the notion of an Inter-Cloud
enviroment where a cloud can use the infrastructure resources
of other clouds. However, there is no common framework in
existence that allows the srevice owners to seamlessly provision
even some basic services across multiple cloud service providers,
albeit not due to any inherent incompatibility or proprietary
nature of the foundation technologies on which these cloud
platforms are built. In this paper we present a novel solution
which aims to cover a gap in a subsection of this problem domain.
Our solution offer a security architecture that enables service
owners to provision a dynamic and service-oriented secure virtual
private network on top of multiple cloud IaaS providers. It does
this by leveraging the scalability, robustness and flexibility of peer-
to-peer overlay techniques to eliminate the manual configuration,
key management and peer churn problems encountered in setting
up the secure communication channels dynamically, between
different components of a typical service that is deployed on
multiple clouds. We present the implementation details of our
solution as well as experimental results carried out on two
commercial clouds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the currently available Cloud Computing solutions
are mainly focused on providing functionalities and services
at the infrastructure level, e.g., improved performance for
virtualization of compute, storage and network resources, as
well as necessary fundamental functionality such as virtual
machine (VM) migrations and server consolidation etc. In the
cases when higher-level and more abstract concerns need to be
addressed, existing Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) solutions
tend to focus on functional aspects only. Furthermore, if a
cloud’s computational and storage infrastructure resources are
overloaded due to increased workloads, its service towards
it clients will degrade. The idea of an Inter-Cloud [1] has
been gaining much traction to address such a situation, where
a cloud can borrow the required infrastructure resources of
other clouds. However, in order to progress from a basic
cloud service infrastructure to a more adaptable cloud service
ecosystem, there is a great need for tools and services that
support and provide higher-level concerns and non-functional
aspects in a comprehensive manner.
The OPTIMIS project [2] is an ongoing effort in this regard
which strives to provide a holistic approach to cloud service
provisioning by offering a single abstraction for multiple coex-
isting cloud architectures. Of the various high-level concerns
being addressed by the OPTIMIS project, a major concern of
high importance is the provisioning of a secure communication
framework to the services utilizing the resources of different
cloud IaaS providers. The usage pattern of these services is
usually quite flexible i.e. on one hand they might be directly
accessed by end-users or on the other hand they might be or-
chestrated by other Service Providers (SP) for their customers.
There are three fundamental steps in the life cycle of a
service in the cloud computing ecosystem; the construction of
the service, the deployment of the service to one or more IaaS
clouds and lastly the operational management of the service.
In the resulting scenarios, the presence of the multiple IaaS
providers in the cloud ecosystem is the key issue that needs
to be addressed by any inter-cloud security solution. A major
goal of service owners is to select IaaS providers in an efficient
way in order to host the different components of their services
on appropraite clouds. In this respect, third-party cloud brokers
[3] can play a major role in simplifying the use, performance
and delivery of the cloud services. These brokers can also
offer an inter-mediation layer spanning across multiple cloud
providers to deliver a host of optimisation and value-added
services which take advantage of the myriad individual cloud
services e.g., aggregation of different services or arbitration
for a best-match service from multiple similar services. For
the numerous interaction possibilities among these parties,
whatever the usage scenarios maybe, the security of data and
the communication between the consumers of the service and
its multiple providers is of paramount importance.
In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that an inter-
cloud security solution is highly desirable that would provide
a framework enabling seamless and secure communication
between the actors of a cloud ecosystem over multiple cloud
platforms. Such a solution, however, has to overcome a number
of challenges because of architectural limitations. This is
because most of the current cloud service platforms, and
the multi-tenants environments they offer, make it difficult
to give the consumers of their services flexible and scalable
control over the core security aspects of their services like
encryption, communication isolation and key management.
Secure communication is also challenged by lack of dynamic
network configurability in most cloud providers, caused by the
inherent limitations of the fixed network architectures offered
by these providers.
In this work we address the secure, flexible and scalable
communication concerns that in our view must be overcome in
order to provide holistic provisioning of services to consumers
from multiple cloud service providers. We present the architec-
ture and design of an inter-cloud secure communication frame-
work that offers the features of dynamic and scalable virtual
network formation, efficient and scalable key management and
minimal manual configuration all on top of secure and private
communication between the components of the service across
multiple cloud platforms. Our architecture provides a single
virtual network to the service using resources from multiple
cloud providers and offers the capability to efficiently and
transparently run services on top of this network while catering
for the dynamic growth and shrinkage of the components of
the service.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section II
we outline the key motivations for our approach. In Section
III we present the background and related works that address
peer-to-peer overlays, virtual network connectivity and key
management issue related to this domain. We elaborate on the
detailed Inter-Cloud Virtual Private Network architecture in
Section IV. In Section V we present our experimental setup
and the analysis of the performance results of our solution.
We conclude in Section VI with the future directions of our
work.
II. MOTIVATION
The design and architecture of our inter-cloud secure com-
munication framework is inspired by a collection of techniques
like Virtual Private Networks [4] (VPN) and Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
Overlays [5]. Network virtualization techniques like VPNs and
P2P Overlays have been shown to provide their users legacy
communication functionalities of their native network environ-
ments, despite the topology, configuration and management
architecture of the actual underlying physical network. This
fits perfectly with our goal of providing a secure virtual private
network as a service to the consumers operating on top of
multiple cloud providers. All complications and complexities
of managing a physical network can be handled by the overlay
network, enabling the services deployed on multiple clouds to
benefit from a customised communication network typically
only available in physical local-area environments.
Traditionally, most of the private network solutions for
similar problem spaces require the direct and continuous
control of a centralised administration entity over every aspect
of the overlay network, consisting of all the participants that
constitute and facilitate the operation of the service being
deployed and run on the multiple cloud providers. Such a
central controller provides services to authenticate, secure
and police the interactions amongst peers. These centralized
solutions make it almost necessary to provide complex support
and management functionalities to meet the user demands of
smooth and continuous operation. Furthermore, to robustly
handle the loads generated by a large number of users, sig-
nificant infrastructure resources and services like mirroring
or redundant instances and load-balancers must be set aside,
incuring additional costs for the service owner. Peer-to-peer
overlays, on the other hand, are designed to offer improved
scalability, flexibility and availability in a distributed fashion
without extensive reliance on centralized servers or resources.
For these reasons, such overlay networks have been used very
successfully to provide specialized application layer services
like voice over IP (VoIP) e.g., Skype [6] and file sharing
e.g., Bittorrent [7]. Structured P2P overlay networks based on
distributed hash tables (DHT) support the scalable storage and
retrieval of key, value pairs on the overlay network which is
very helpful when we need to store and retrieve meta-data
related to the virtual private network management. Existing
P2P algorithms like Chord [8], Pastry [9] and Tapestry [10]
have been widely used to provide scalable and fast information
storage and retrieval services for a vast variety of applications.
We have leveraged the Kademlia algorithm [11] to cater for our
storage and retrieval requirements to build up a virtual private
network. This DHT-based algorithm locates values using the
peer ID and guarantees that on average, any data object can be
located in O (log N) peer hops, N being the number of peers
in the overlay.
Therefore, by provisioning a VPN among the nodes of a
P2P overlay network, we can enable feature of using secure
communication between the components of a service deployed
on multiple clouds. Furthermore, we promote an approach
where a distributed and scalable key management framework
is utilized to provide the cryptographic primitives used to
establish secure tunnels among the nodes of the P2P overlay
networks. The synergy of these three technologies produces a
scalable, secure and robust inter-cloud communication solution
which is able to handle a large number of communicating peers
with considerably less management complexity.
In this paper, we present the design and architecture of
such an Inter-Cloud Virtual Private Network (ICVPN) solution,
which provides secure communication facilities to service
owners that want to deploy their service components over
the infrastructure of multiple cloud IaaS providers. At its
core, it provides the ability to automatically establish peer-
to-peer overlay networks among the virtual machines (VMs)
constituting the cloud service. Using the same P2P techniques,
we also offer a distributed key management service which
facilitates the binding of cryptographic constructs like keys,
certificates and tokens to the VMs constituting the service.
The configuration and maintenance of the VPN connections
using the P2P overlay is autonomous and transparent to the
service, as a major goal of our work is to free the service owner
from the complicated configurations typically required to set
up the key management and virtual networking infrastructures
in similar problem spaces.
III. RELATED WORK
The central thrust of our architecture is the provisioning of a
secure virtual private network over multi-cloud infrastructure.
VPNs have been a mainstay for providing secure remote access
over wide-area networks to resources in private organizational
networks for a long time. Well-known tools and softwares
like OpenVPN [12] are used to create secure point-to-point
or site-to-site connections for authenticated remote access.
However, the main problem in client/server based approaches
is that they require centralized servers to manage the life
cycle of all the secure connections for the participating clients,
hence suffering from a single point-of-failure. Another issue
is the quite complex and error prone configuration problems
especially if you want to construct and manage a large-scale
network not having a relatively simple topology, as it would
require customised configuration on every client and even
more elaborate management and routing configuration on the
server-side. Another major drawback is the complexity of key
distribution among all the participating clients in a VPN, as the
software itself does not provide any key distribution service
and all keys have to be manually transferred to individual
hosts. In case of PKI model, an additional requirement of a
trusted Certificate Authority exists that has to issue individual
certificates to all the servers and clients constituting a VPN,
which incurs an additional communication overhead when
forming a virtual private network.
There have been some other VPN solutions for large-scale
networks aimed at grid and cluster computing environments,
such as VIOLIN [13] and VNET [14], that do not follow a
strict client/server model based approach. VNET is a layer
2 virtual networking tool that relies on a VNET server run-
ning on a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) hosting a virtual
machine in a remote network which establishes an encrypted
tunnel connection to a VNET server running on a machine
(called Proxy) inside the users home network. All of the
remote virtual machines communication goes through this
tunnel and the goal of the Proxy is to emulate the remote virtual
machine as a local host on the users home network, in effect
presenting it as a member of the same LAN. The motivation
of this approach is to tackle the users lack of administrative
control at remote grid sites to manipulate network resources
like routing and resource reservations etc. but it suffers from
the previously discussing problem of complex and manual
configuration though going for the simplicity of a private LAN.
Also the scalability will be a big issue for the Proxy as the
number of remote virtual machines grows as each will require
a secure tunnel connection and corresponding virtual network
interface mapped to the Proxys network interface by the VNET
server software.
VIOLIN is a small-scale virtual network with virtual
routers, switches and end hosts implemented in software and
hosted by User-Mode Linux (UML) enabled machines as
virtual appliances. It allows for the dynamic establishment of a
private layer 3 virtual network among virtual machines, how-
ever, it doesnt offer dynamic or automatic network deployment
or route management to setup the virtual network. Virtual links
are established between the virtual appliances using encrypted
UDP tunnels that have to be manually setup and are not
self-configuring, making it cumbersome to establish inter-host
connections in flexible and dynamic fashion.
P2P VPN solutions like Hamachi [15] and N2N [16]
have come up as peer-to-peer alternatives to centralized and
client/server model based VPNs. Hamachi is a shareware
application that is capable of establishing direct links between
computers that are behind NAT firewalls. A backend cluster
of servers are used to enable NAT traversal and establish
direct peer-to-peer connections among its clients. Each client
establishes and maintains a control connection to the server
cluster. It is mainly used for internet gaming and remote
administration but suffers from scalability issues as each peer
has to maintain the connection with the server as well as any
other peers it wants to communicate with, ending up with
the overhead of a mesh-topology. It therefore offers limited
number of peers (16 per virtual network) and limited number of
concurrent clients (50 per virtual network). The keys used for
connection encryption and authentication are also controlled
by the vendors servers and individual users do not initially
control who has access to their network. N2N is a layer 2 VPN
solution which doesnt require a centralized backend cluster of
servers like Hamachi but it uses a peer-to-peer overlay network
similar to Skype, where a number of dedicated super-nodes are
used as relay agents for edge nodes that cannot communicate
directly with each other due to firewall or NAT restrictions.
The edge nodes connect to a super-node at start-up and pre-
shared TwoFish [17] keys are used for link encryption. As it
operates on layer 2, the users of the overlay have to configure
their IP addresses etc. It also assumes node membership as
relatively static with edge nodes rarely leaving or joining the
network over their life cycle.
More recently, some commercial cloud computing services
have been made available by different vendors that provide a
virtual private network inside their public cloud offering and
offering the customers some limited degree of control over this
network, which is called a Virtual Private Cloud (VPC). Prime
examples in this domain are Amazon Virtual Private Cloud
[18], Google Secure Data Connector [19] and CohsiveFT VPN-
Cubed [20]. These are aimed at enterprise customers to allow
them to access their resource deployed on the vendors cloud
over an IPSec [21] based virtual private network. Although
these products allow the possibility of leveraging the cloud
providers APIs to flexibly grow and shrink their networks, the
management and configuration is as complex as a traditional
network as components of the VPC such as internet gateways,
VPN servers, NAT instances and subnets have to be managed
by the customers themselves. Furthermore, the customers are
required to setup an IPSec device on their premises that
connects to an IPSec gateway in the VPC running as a virtual
appliance which integrates the enterprises network with the
VPC subnet in the cloud. Most importantly, with the exception
of [20], these solutions are locked to single cloud vendor
and [20] provides use of a selective set of cloud providers
by placing its virtual appliances as VPN gateways in these
cloud infrastructures and allowing the customers to join these
gateways in a mesh topology manually.
IV. INTER-CLOUD VPN ARCHITECTURE
In this section we present the inter-Cloud VPN architecture
(ICVPN) that we are proposing. The architecture consists of
two main components, namely (a) the peer-to-peer overlay and
(b) the secure virtual private connections, as described below.
A. Peer-to-Peer Overlay
The core technique employed by the ICVPN concept is the
use of two tiers of P2P overlays. A universal P2P overlay is
used to provide a scalable and secure service infrastructure
to initiate and bind multiple VPN overlays to different cloud
services. The universal overlay itself can be initiated either
by the service owner, the cloud broker or the cloud service
providers. It helps with the bootstrapping activity of VPN
peers. It also provides other functionalities such as service
advertisement, service discovery mechanisms, and service code
provisioning, with minimal requirement for manual configura-
tion and administration.. This approach acts as an aggregation
service for the eventual peered overlay resources (which in
this case are virtual machines) span across multiple cloud
domains to help form a virtual private network. The peers
of the universal overlay act as super peers for the nodes of
the underlying overlays and let new nodes enroll, authenticate,
bootstrap and join a particular VPN overlay based on the cloud
service requiring a VPN service.
Fig. 1. Two-tiered architecture for the Inter-Cloud VPN solution
As depicted in Fig. 1, the service owner/provider or the
cloud broker could itself be a peer in the universal overlay and
a subset of the universal overlay peers can act as super-peers
for the peer nodes of the VPN overlay for a particular cloud
service. The universal overlay peers can join and leave the sys-
tem dynamically and additional VMs from the cloud providers
can be provisioned to act as the universal overlay peers as well.
As both the universal and the VPN overlay nodes are basically
VMs provisioned from different cloud providers, they can be
demoted or promoted from these overlays respectively based
on parameters like performance and availability.
To join the universal overlay, each peer needs to acquire a
unique identification number (peerID). In most structured P2P
systems, this is done by the peer itself by choosing a random
number from a large identity space, however, this approach is
vulnerable to Sybil attacks [22]. Due to the security constraints
of our solution, we require some trusted authorities to allocate
peerIDs to the participating peers. We solve this identity
management problem by using Trusted Third Party (TTP)
model to authenticate peers and allocate them their identities.
We make use of the traditional PKI approach and designate the
super-peers of the Universal Overlay as Certificate Authorities
(CA) for the underlying VPN overlays peers. The CA assigns
peerIDs to the peers and signs a certificate that binds the
ID of the cloud service utilizing the VPN (serviceID) and
peerID within the public certificate of the peer for a limited
time duration. The peer then can use this signed certificate to
authenticate itself with other peers in the overlay.
Fig. 2. Architecture of a P2P client in the VPN overlay
In a typical usage scenario, the service owner is responsible
for provisioning virtual machines from cloud service providers
to deploy and run their services. These virtual machines are
considered as the peers of the VPN overlays and the complete
life-cycle of the peers is handled by a P2P client embedded in
the appliance image used to instantiate a virtual machine on a
cloud platform. However, a further advantage of the universal
overlay approach is that the peers of a VPN overlay can get,
update and modify the P2P client program dynamically from
the super-peers in the universal overlay. The program to be
run is signed by the super-peers for validity and it can check
for updated versions of itself by querying for the associated
serviceID in the persistent store of the universal overlays DHT.
B. Secure Virtual Private Connections
The key feature of our ICVPN is establishing a secure
communication network between the peers of the overlay
formed over a collection of cloud providers infrastructure.
Therefore, after successfully joining the overlay network to
become part of a service, a VPN peer starts the process of
creating secure tunnels to the other peers of the service it wants
to communicate with, according to the functional operations
of that particular service. To achieve this, we make use of
IPSec [23] to authenticate and encrypt each IP packet of a
communication session between the peers, thus creating end-
to-end tunnels which provide protection against eavesdropping,
message tempering and message forgeries. For establishing
mutual authentication between peers at the beginning of the
session and negotiation of cryptographic keys to be used during
the session, we employ the Internet Key Exchange protocol
[24], which makes use of standard cryptographic primitives
like public key cryptography [25] for establishing mutual
authentication and AES [26] for the actual encryption of
packets in transition. The practical advantage of this approach
is the reuse of existing frameworks and tools which have been
thoroughly tried and tested in a myriad of different domains,
are widely used and have been adopted in both academic and
commercial domain. The main components of the P2P client
used to construct a virtual private network topology in our
model are shown in Fig. 2.
The P2P client software sets up and configures the IPSec
security associations according the the service network security
policy, which is advertised by the service owner through the
DHT of the Universal Overlay. The peers of the underlying
VPN overlay periodically check for any update in the security
policy and apply and enforce any changes on the kernel of the
VM through the P2P client’s IPSec interface.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we present the results of a series of exper-
iments we conducted to evaluate the effect of our prototype
ICVPN solution upon the network performance of a service
deployed on two different cloud IaaS providers. We use a 3-
tier web service comprising of database, business logic and
presentation components deployed on nine virtual machines
hosted on the clouds of British Telecom Ltd. and Flexiant Ltd.,
our partners in the EU OPTIMIS project. The purpose of these
experiments is to evaluate the architecture being proposed, in
terms of service latency and service throughput, in a practical
scenario with a service deployed over a real wide-area network,
with the BT cloud geographically located in Ipswich, England
and Flexiant cloud located in Livingston, Scotland. We define
service latency as the inter-cloud round-trip time taken by a
HTTP request, issued by a service component on one cloud, to
get a response from the target service component on a different
cloud. Similarly, service throughput is the inter-cloud network
throughtput between service components deployed on different
clouds.
A. Analysis: Service Latency
We compare the latency between the components of the
service deployed on different cloud providers, as the latency
between the components in the same cloud is almost negligible
as they are usually hosted on the same hyper-visor. We
measured the latency by using the round-trip delay of an HTTP
HEAD request/response pair, as the components of the web
service communicate with each other using HTTP protocol and
ICMP, the de facto latency measurement protocol, is blocked in
the networks of our cloud providers. We computed the average
latency by running 10 experiments very hour for a period of
24 hours, firstly without using the ICVPN solution and then
with it. The results are shown in Fig. 3.
Looking at the results, we can see that using our solution
only has a small impact on the HTTP latency, increasing it
Fig. 3. Mean latency of 240 round-trip time experiments in both directions
between BT and Flexiant clouds
just by about 5%. For ease of analysis, we collect the network
traffic dump when running our experiments, using the tcpdump
packet sniffer. We found out from the traffic dumps that the
increased delay we encountered is mostly due to the additional
packets tranmitted and received by the peers for the purposes
of key exchange and cryptographic primitives negotitation
when establishing an IPSec tunnel. After this initial handshake
phase is over, the latency performance is almost same in the
comparitive experiments.
B. Analysis: Service Throughput
We measure the throughput between components of the
service deployed on different cloud providers by using Iperf
[27], a commonly used network testing tool. We measured the
throughput in both directions by transferring 30 MB data, a
size chosen empirically to saturate the WAN links between
the components and get the throughput results representing
realistic conditions. We computed the average throughput by
running 10 experiments every hour for a period of 24 hours,
firstly without using the ICVPN solution and then applying the
security policy to tunnel the traffic through IPSec. The results
are shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Mean throughput of 240 data transmission experiments in both
directions between BT and Flexiant clouds
From the throughput results, the first thing that stands out
is the difference in the throughput values depending on the
direction of transferring the data. Although we don’t have
the detailed knowledge of the underlying physical wide-area
network connectivity between the two cloud service providers,
such readings are not unheard of in this domain and are
usually due to differences in upstream and downstream traf-
fic conditions, different routes chosen by the IP packets or
network configuration issues. Irrespective of that, by looking
at the comparative results it is clear that we just incur a
small overhead in the throughput, of about 10%. By analysing
the traffic dumps generated from the throughout test, we can
attribute this overhead to the IKE and IPSec handshakes in
addition to the extra time taken by the VM kernel in encrypting
and encapsulating 30 MB of data for each throughput test.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a scalable and robust secure
communication framework for services deployed in an inter-
cloud environment. We employ the flexibility and scalability
afforded by structure peer-to-peer overlays to join virtual
machines running on different cloud IaaS providers with each
other using IPSec tunnels, hence providing confidentiality,
authentication and integrity for all the data exchanged between
different components of the service. Our solution needs min-
imal manual configuration as peers are automated to discover
the information needed to perform their operations from the
Universal Overlay. We also provide a distributed and scalable
key management solution for the consumption of the virtual
machines to set-up the secure communication channels. Our
solution supports the dynamic addition and removal of nodes
from the VPN overlay as we use the peer-to-peer DHT not
just as a command and control channel for managing the
VPN peers but also for the churn management of peers in the
VPN overlay. We have evaluated a prototype implementation
based on experiments conducted in realistic conditions, over
multiple cloud infrastructure environments and found minimal
latency and throughput overhead of creating and maintaining
the ICVPN connections among the participating VMs of a
service.
In the future, we aim to provide a federated identity man-
agement solution utilising the ICVPN architecture in conjunc-
tion with Hierarchical Identity-Based Cryptography (HIBC)
[28].
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